Results tagged “intelligence”

Few days ago I attended one of the Google Seattle Tech Talks; this one was given by Helen Greiner, iRobot's co-founder and chairman. She was visiting Seattle to sign the licensing agreement for UW's Seagliders and stopped at Google Kirkland to talk about iRobot and its robots.

Her talk was interesting, not so much for the descriptions of robots that iRobot develops, but mostly for the history of the company and their learning experience as they were trying to design and build robots and find their market to sell products to survive. This somewhat reminded me the story of Webmind AI Engine (Waking Up from the Economy of Dreams), albeit with a happy ending as iRobot is a live and profitable company (although its stock has been trading recently close to 52-week low).

There was a brief Q-and-A session in the end and I had an opportunity to ask a few questions, one of them was "When do you see your robots becoming more intelligent?" Helen's response was that intelligence is a complex term, but their robots are intelligent to some degree: they don't fall off the stairs, can sense objects around them, interact with virtual walls, can re-dock themselves, and, most importantly, they clean carpets and floors and do a good job at that. Essentially -- what follows is obviously my interpretation -- they are well designed for a particular task and there is no obvious need or an easy way for them to become more intelligent.

As I own several generations of Roombas I'm familiar with how they operate and what they are capable of. Still, I struggled to counter Helen's definition of intelligence without falling prey to Tesler's Theorem -- "AI is whatever hasn't been done yet" (Godel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid, p.601). Do Roombas possess even limited intelligence? I do not believe so and here is why.

It's not so much the ability to solve a problem that is critical to intelligence as it is the ability to learn how to solve problems. Most of the tests for intelligence seem to be focused on testing ability to solve problems, relying on the assumption that if you can solve those problems you learned the ability to solve them, hence you're intelligent. A better way to test intelligence would be have some sort of dynamic test when you learn to solve problems as part of the test and the progress you make would define your level of intelligence. Otherwise we don't really test intelligence so much as we test experience.

Wang From NARS to a Thinking Machine, p.2: "...whether the system is intelligent, or how intelligent it is, is not determined by what the system can do, but what it can learn to do."

Roombas don't learn; they don't improve their actions. For example, I have 5-inch space between floor transition in my kitchen and thick carpet in my living room and Roomba keeps getting stuck there (literally; it can't move and needs to be picked up). With more intelligence, it could possibly learn to avoid those spots or maybe go through them using a different direction. They also don't acquire new actions and don't generate actions to do their job more effectively. Even their initial "experience" is not acquired, but hard wired based on experience of its designers. While there are noticeable differences between the first and last generations of Roomba -- more autonomy, ability to dock itself and to sense objects and slow down before hitting an obstacle, and other things -- this is still not enough to call it intelligent.

The more difficult question is, if we add more sensors, mapping capabilities, working memory, and other components, would it make it intelligent then? I will not attempt to answer this question here, but will do a separate post on how I define intelligence and what it may take to make an intelligent robot.

Questions to Ponder

Questions to ponder after reading of Cognition and Reality, The Quest for Consciousness, and The Feeling of What Happens.

  • How does it happen that different people notice different aspects of the same situation?
  • Why are some potions of the retinal input treated as belonging to the same object, others as independent?
    • May it have something to do with results of co-occurrence analysis?
  • Why do we often seem to perceive the meanings of events rather than their detectable surface features?
  • How are successive glances at the same scene "integrated"?
  • Why is perceiving almost always accurate, given inadequacies of the retinal image?
  • If percepts are constructed, why are they usually accurate?
  • What kind of cognitive structure does perception require?
  • What happens when we choose what to see and how do we learn to see better?
  • How are illusions and errors possible if perception is simply the pickup of information that is already available and specific?
  • How do we pickup unanticipated information?
  • What happens when a new object enters the field of view for the first time?
  • How is it decided whether to use an existing schema or to develop a new one (exploitation vs. exploration)?
  • How can anything at all be seen in a brief flash if perception is a temporally extended activity?
  • How is schema modified by new information? What elements of it are being modified? Anticipation? Motor program?
  • Is development of the schema from the general to the specific, from undifferentiated to precise or in the opposite direction?
  • Why do introspective reports suggest that the meaning is available first, and the stimulus details only later or not at all?
    • This is probably because introspection starts from the highest level schema of all active schemata
  • How does schema come to exist?
    • Some may be innate, but for those that are not, what's the mechanism? Co-occurrence?
    • The perceptual cycle must occur before it can develop
  • Can we perceive something not having an appropriate schema?
    • Maybe only at the lowest possible level, which will allow for bootstrapping based on some mechanism, like co-occurrence.
  • Which schema develops earlier: the more complex "high-level" one, or the more simple "low-level" schema? (for example, shape vs. smile)
  • How do schemata get co-activated? When they are related? Include one another? Not related?
  • Does a schema for a concept (for example, "number") get easier and faster activated than a schema for an object that is part of that category (for example, number "five")? How do they influence each other?
  • Is it possible to deploy more than one schema at a time?
    • Yes, multiple schemata can be active, even though they have different level of activation (and influence of other schemata); based on that level of activation they compete with other schemata for resources (gaze, effectors, and so on)
  • What does presence of expected/unexpected information in the environment does to the schema? In terms of activation? In terms of its modification?
  • Why is it difficult to pick up information from two different messages/streams at the same time?
  • Is it possible to attend to two things at once?
  • What are the limits of automatic mental activity?
  • Why/how does perception depend on a skill? What skill is that?
    • Motor program that supports co-activation of other programs...
  • Are schemata being influenced (activated/modified) by unattended information?
  • Is there a single mechanism responsible for our cognitive limitations? What are the limitations? (The Magical Number Seven)
  • What types of conflicts may arise from activation of two schemata? How do those conflicts get resolved/arbitrated?
  • Is there some impediment to the parallel development of independent, but similar schemata? Does existing schema "canalize" incoming information and experience effectively preventing the second (similar) schema to be formed?
  • Is consciousness an aspect of activity or an independently definable mechanism?
  • Is it possible to think without being conscious?
  • How does the subject know whether the present content of his consciousness originated with an external stimulus?
  • Does imagery appear when pickup of information is delayed or interrupted?
  • If images are anticipations rather than pictures, what's going on when we describe them?
  • How can we imagine things we don't expect, for example, things we know cannot happen?
    • Anticipations concern things that only might come to pass rather than those things whose existence is already established
  • How does detachment of images from the immediate context come about?
    • This detachment occurs inevitably in at least one situation with which we are all familiar: locomotion
    • Any delay between the anticipation and the pickup creates a state of unfulfilled perceptual readiness, and the inner aspect of that active shema is a mental image
  • How are cognitive maps (and other types of schemata) acquired?
  • What sorts of information do they incorporate at various stages in their development?
  • How are they altered by experience?
  • Under what conditions are they forgotten?
  • Where many schemata exist, what distinguishes the right one?
  • How schemata stored in memory? What represents long-term memory?
    • Repeated representation of the same material constitute a regularity to be detected
    • Use of schemata accounts for remembering
    • Forgetting occurs whenever the present inputis not specific enough to select a schema unequivocally
  • What's the difference between perception and imagery?
    • Perception is a cyclic activity that includes an anticipatory phase; imagery is anticipation occurring alone
  • What schemata are we born with? Schemata sensitive to expressions of emotion? Intentions?
  • How words come to refer to objects?
    • Is it required to be "engaged in two perceptual cycles at once"? (Cognition and Reality, p.164)
    • Are those words embedded in the schema or related to/associated with it?
  • What is the principal function of grammatical structure of a sentence?
    • Is it to help the listener to develop proper anticipations that may span many seconds? (Ibid, p.167)
  • How does one describe what one sees?
  • Why do we feel that we know what we're going to say, but only in some general way?
  • How does anticipations get detached from the stimulus information that generated them to become things we imagine?
  • Who has more freedom in their actions: adult or infant?
  • How do we perceive emotion of feeling in others?
    • Perceiver needs to have schemata to pick this information up
    • How much do these schemata depend on social experience?
  • Why do we (sometimes) hear multiple voices arguing?
  • How is anticipated image formed? What specifically is being anticipated (out of many possibilities)?
  • How is movie-in-the-brain generated? How does the brain generate the sense of an owner and observer for that movie?
  • What's the relationship between consciousness and emotion? (Emotion And Consciousness)
  • Are there any non-conscious feelings? Are we conscious of all our emotions and feelings?
  • What distinguishes emotion from feeling?
    • Emotions are external indication of feelings
    • Emotions are experienced as feelings
    • Emotions play signaling role; feelings facilitate learning and motivate behavior (on a larger scale) or produce a specific behavior (on a smaller scale) like freezing
      • "[Pleasure] is related to the clever anticipation of what can be done not to have a problem." "[Nature] seduces us into good behavior." (The Feeling of What Happens, p.78)
    • Expression of emotion drives feeling, which in turn supports expression of emotion; chicken and egg
  • Can we control/suppress emotions/feelings?
  • Why do we need to be conscious to have feelings or express emotions?
  • What's the difference between sensing pain and knowing you have pain?
  • What distinguishes zombies from normal (non-zombie) organisms? Automatism? Lack of intentions? Lack of continuity of purpose? Always-on learning (zombie learning)?
  • What are the properties of consciousness?
    • William James (cf. The Feeling of What Happens, p.126): it's personal, selective, continuous, and pertains to objects rather than itself
  • Why is there significant delay (up to 500ms; Libet's experiments) between registering of a sensation and conscious experience of it?
  • How does always changing mind preserve its identity? What is is that provides mind with this core that is always the same? Is "self" a concept as any other concept and is built based on interactions with other individuals (culture and meme links)?

About

I am Paul Kulchenko.
I live in Kirkland, WA with my wife and three kids.
I work for Six Apart as a software developer.
I study machine learning and artificial intelligence.
I write books and open-source software.

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